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In the face of budget crises, declining enrollments, and evolving community needs, school leaders must make difficult decisions regarding the involuntary transfer of teachers and other school personnel. Leaders must consider fiscal health, employee morale, student needs, and, importantly, the legal implications of such moves. This article summarizes a U.S. Supreme Court employee transfer case, Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024), and provides specific guidance for transfers of teachers, administrators, and other school employees. It concludes with practical implications to help school leaders avoid litigation and make the most-informed personnel decisions.

Adverse Action Standard Clarified

The main federal employment discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), makes it unlawful for a school “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” due to their protected class. Therefore, to prevail in an employment discrimination lawsuit, an employee must present evidence that they were subject to an adverse employment action because of their protected class. Adverse actions include terminations, demotions, and non-renewals, as well as some involuntary transfers. Pursuant to Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, protected classes include race, color, national origin, religion, sex, disability, and age. While federal law sets the floor, states can add additional protected classes (e.g., veteran status).

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the standard defining an adverse employment action. Although the case involved a police officer, the Court’s decision impacts how school leaders should handle employee transfers. In Muldrow, a female police officer was transferred from a plainclothes intelligence division position to a uniformed officer division. Though the transfer did not result in a change in pay or rank, it did result in a change in responsibilities, schedule, and perks. In the intelligence division position, the officer had a consistent Monday-to-Friday schedule, was given an unmarked police vehicle, and worked closely with the FBI on high-profile investigations. In the new position, the officer’s schedule became less predictable, often including weekend work. She also lost access to her vehicle and was assigned less prestigious tasks.

While the employer argued that the officer had not suffered an adverse employment action because the officer still had the same compensation and rank, the Court disagreed. It decided that the officer only needed to show that the transfer caused “some harm” not necessarily “significant, serious, or substantial harm” as earlier cases had required. As such, the officer had shown that her involuntary transfer constituted an adverse employment action.

The Court’s opinion included one example of what would qualify as an adverse employment action in the school context: a principal being moved to a non-school-based administrative role in which they supervise fewer employees. Because this is the only guidance from the Court on how this standard may impact school transfers, and because school employees are frequently transferred, it is necessary to look to lower court decisions for greater clarity.

Therefore, the following sections summarize relevant, school-related court decisions applying the new Muldrow standard to illustrate when transfers of teachers, administrators, and other school employees may constitute an adverse employment action.

Teachers

Teachers are often reassigned to new schools or positions. For example, following a change in leadership, an Alabama school district engaged in a districtwide restructuring (Bennett v. Butler Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2025). As part of it, a school counselor was reassigned to a position as a kindergarten teacher. The transfer did not result in a change in compensation, work hours, or work location. The counselor, however, noted that the teaching position was less prestigious, had less student impact, and would make it harder for the counselor to secure a raise. She also had not received any professional development related to teaching. Instead, the counselor, who had been in her position for 16 years, claimed that the transfer resulted in damage to her future career prospects. The federal district court found that, pursuant to the Muldrow “some injury” standard, the employee had suffered an adverse employment action.

Not only can transfers from non-teaching positions to teaching positions satisfy this test, but so too can transfers from one grade level to another. In another case, a teacher was transferred from an elementary to a middle school though she had no experience teaching middle school students, and a Maryland federal district court deemed the reassignment an adverse employment action (Ruth v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 2026).

Courts have also considered the change in physical location because of a transfer. For example, a Nebraska federal district court found that a teacher experienced an adverse employment action when she was transferred to a school “further away from where she lived and not in her field of expertise” (Hollins v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2025, p. *1). The court also noted that another employee had requested to be moved to that school, but the school denied that request and transferred the teacher instead.

Administrators

Additionally, courts have applied the post-Muldrow standard to administrators who were transferred. In Leon v. Bensalem Township School District (2024), an administrator’s position was changed from “Assistant to the Superintendent” to “Assistant to the Superintendent—Teaching and Learning.” Her original job description had 32 enumerated duties while the new position had 64 enumerated duties. Though the transfer did not result in a salary change, the new position resulted in the employee being cut out of administrative communications, eliminating her Title IX and school board liaison responsibilities, and losing oversight of direct reports. The Pennsylvania federal district court found the effects of the transfer were “objectively adverse” and constituted an adverse employment action.

Other cases have clarified that even when an employee retains their administrator’s contract and same pay following a demotion—e.g., from principal to assistant principal—that can still constitute an adverse employment action due to reduced promotion prospects and future financial impacts (e.g., Bellamy v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2025).

“Be cautious that an objective observer would not characterize the transfer as a demotion as it relates to prestige and future career prospects.”

Other School Employees

Recent lower courts have also applied Muldrow’s new standard to school employees beyond teachers and administrators. In Pawlik v. Buffalo City School District (2025), a school operated a restaurant as part of a culinary arts program. An employee had previously worked in a “front of the house” role but was moved to a kitchen position. A New York federal district court found that the transfer resulted in a more physically demanding, less public-facing role. The transfer was also to a department that was facing financial distress. Considering these factors, the court concluded the employee suffered an adverse employment action.

While most post-Muldrow cases have resulted in a finding of an adverse employment action, not all have. In one such case, a school’s maintenance employee was originally assigned to work the A Shift but was transferred to the B Shift (Downer v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2024). Both shifts completed the same work and were the same length. The only difference was that the A Shift started an hour earlier than the B Shift. A Maryland federal district court determined that the employee failed to show an adverse employment action, as the transfer did not cause any loss of prestige or responsibility.

Practical Implications

As highlighted in these cases, when determining whether a transfer is an adverse employment action, courts have considered experience, geographic location, responsibilities, prestige, fiscal stability of the new role, and future career prospects. Therefore, administrators should:

  • Transfer employees based on licensure and experience qualifications.
  • Be cautious that an objective observer would not characterize the transfer as a demotion as it relates to prestige and future career prospects.
  • Solicit volunteers for the transfers before involuntary assignments.
  • Understand employees’ interests, geographic location, and professional goals.

Additionally, proving an adverse employment action is just one element to prevailing in an employment discrimination claim. An employee must also show that they belong to a protected class, they were meeting their employer’s legitimate performance expectations, and that the adverse employment action was caused by the employee’s protected class (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 1973). Even if they meet this burden, the school can still prevail by showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action (e.g., budget cuts).

Hannah B. Gahimer, JD, is a clinical assistant professor of education law at Indiana University and a former school district attorney. Janet R. Decker, JD, PhD, is a professor of education law at Indiana University and co-author of the new edition of Legal Rights of School Leaders, Teachers, and Students.

References

Bellamy v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2025 WL 749624 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2025).

Bennett v. Butler Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2025 WL 27598 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 3, 2025).

Downer v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2024 WL 3277563 (D. Md. July 2, 2024).

Hollins v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 2025 WL 1448629 (D. Neb. May 20, 2025).

Leon v. Bensalem Twp. Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 3744352 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2024)

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024).

Pawlik v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 2025 WL 4480996 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025).

Ruth v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 2026 WL 607620 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2026).